Amid an overwhelming flood of information—much of it propaganda, and very little of it reliable—and a news cycle with the memory of a goldfish, trying to make sense of the U.S. and Israel’s war on Iran can be exhausting. To resist this imposed immediacy, perhaps one of the oldest treatises on war can still offer some guidance.
One of the beauties of the internet—and also one of its nightmares—is that no angle remains unexplored when it comes to the news. There is never a shortage of explanations or theories about why events happen and what their consequences might be. The war on Iran is no different. Yet the “fog of war” is real, and today we must also contend with a “fog of information,” deliberately thickened during times of conflict.
To cut through that informational fog, it may be useful to step back and examine present events through the eyes of the past. Sun Tzu’s The Art of War may still have something to say about the direction this conflict could take.
In the first chapter, Sun Tzu explains that the outcome of a war can be anticipated through two main considerations: which side has planned and prepared more effectively, and which side has fulfilled the necessary conditions for victory.
“Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought. The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose.”
There are some indications that the United States may have been preparing for a war against Iran for several months. The “12 Days War” was interpreted by many observers as a prelude. In December 2025, the U.S. moved more than 1,000 Paveway guided bomb kits from Osan Air Base in Korea back to the United States. In January 2026, it raided Venezuela and allegedly abducted its president, an action that some analysts interpret as an attempt to secure oil supplies before potential disruptions in the Arabian Gulf.
However, at the same time, there are signs that Washington may not have been fully prepared. The Trump administration failed to refill tçhe U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve, and air defenses in the region appear insufficient for a prolonged campaign against Iran. Moreover, the overall strategic objective of the war remains unclear.
It could also be argued that the U.S. has contemplated war with Iran since at least 2001, when General Wesley Clark stated that he had been shown a plan by the Bush administration to attack seven countries in five years. Yet even if this claim is accurate, it represents a broad geopolitical strategy rather than a concrete operational war plan—and recent history in Iraq shows how poorly such plans can unfold.
Iran, on the other hand, has arguably been preparing for such a conflict since the 1979 revolution. More specifically, since at least 2003, when IRGC Commander General Mohammad Ali Jafari, after seeing Saddam’s collapse, reorganized Iran’s defense structure and developed the “Mosaic Doctrine” (or Mosaic Defense) to ensure regime survival against a militarily superior opponent such as the United States. The doctrine combines a decentralized command with conventional forces and asymmetric tactics involving the Basij militia, missile systems, and drone warfare—precisely the kind of strategy we are seeing today.
According to Sun Tzu’s first parameter—which side has prepared and planned more effectively—it could be argued that Iran currently holds the advantage. This assessment may also apply to Israel, which revealed much of its strategy during the previous round of fighting in June, after which Iran dismantled Israel’s intelligence network inside the country. Israel’s apparent strategy has largely been to draw the United States directly into the conflict, hoping that the sheer weight of American firepower would prove decisive. So far, that does not appear to be the case.
Sun Tzu also argues that when assessing the prospects of war, one must consider five constant factors: (1) The Moral Law (2) Heaven (3) Earth (4) The Commander (5) Method and Discipline. To evaluate these factors, he proposes seven guiding questions:
“(1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral law? (2) Which of the two generals has most ability? (3) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth? (4) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced? (5) Which army is stronger? (6) On which side are officers and men more highly trained? (7) In which army is there the greater constancy both in reward and punishment? By means of these seven considerations I can forecast victory or defeat.”
Let us briefly examine each of these questions.
The Moral Law
The first question asks: which sovereign is most aligned with the moral law? Some commentators interpret this as the degree to which a ruler is in harmony with the population. In modern terms, it might refer to whether the government shares a common worldview with its citizens and whether the public believes in the legitimacy of the war.
In the United States, public approval of the war stands at only 27%, while 43% oppose it and 29% remain uncertain. Comparable polling data from Iran is not readily available, but large demonstrations in support of the government and the new Supreme Leader have been reported despite ongoing bombardment.
Meanwhile, the MAGA movement—President Trump’s core political base—appears deeply divided, with influential figures such as Tucker Carlson and Steve Bannon openly opposing the war.
Public trust in the U.S. government has also declined significantly over time. According to Pew Research, around 70% of Americans trusted the federal government in the 1950s; today that figure has fallen to roughly 30%. Gallup reported in 2021 that approximately 59% of Iranians supported their government, though such statistics should be interpreted cautiously.
More importantly, around 90% of Iran’s population identifies with the Shia branch of Islam, which creates a shared ideological framework between the political leadership and much of the population. In the United States, by contrast, about 62% identify as Christian, but the religious landscape is fragmented across numerous denominations with divergent worldviews (this also exists in Iran, but it could be argued that not as much as in the U.S.)
In Israel, 93% of Jewish Israelis reportedly support the war with Iran, according to recent polling. While this suggests strong domestic backing, Israel cannot sustain the conflict without U.S. support, which limits the strategic significance of that consensus.
Overall, when each government is considered individually, Iran appears to perform better according to Sun Tzu’s first criterion.
The Commander
The second question concerns which general has the greater ability. For the sake of comparison, let us assume that U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth represents the highest military authority on the American side, while Ahmad Vahidi—recently appointed commander of the IRGC—serves as Iran’s senior operational military figure beneath the Supreme Leader.
Ahmad Vahidi is a product of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps from its earliest days in the late 1970s. He rose through the ranks during the Iran-Iraq War, holding key intelligence and command positions. Iranian state media reports that he led the elite Quds Force from 1988 to 1997. He later served as defense minister under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and interior minister under President Ebrahim Raisi, leaving office in 2024.
Pete Hegseth, by contrast, graduated from Princeton, served in the U.S. Army for 16 years with deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan, and later became a prominent television commentator and media personality.
If forced to compare the two purely in terms of military career trajectory, one might reasonably argue that Vahidi possesses deeper strategic experience within a state military structure.
Heaven and Earth
The third question concerns the advantages derived from “Heaven and Earth,” which Sun Tzu describes as factors such as timing, seasons, geography, distances, terrain, and logistical conditions.
In a short and intense conflict dominated by airpower, these factors might initially favor the United States and Israel. However, in a prolonged conflict, especially one shaped by logistics and geography, the advantage shifts toward Iran.
This is particularly true when considering the economic dimension of the war. Both the material costs of prolonged operations and the potential disruption to international trade could affect the United States and Israel more severely than Iran, whose economy has already adapted to decades of sanctions and isolation.
Method and Discipline
The remaining questions—discipline, strength of the army, training of officers and soldiers, and consistency of reward and punishment—fall under Sun Tzu’s fifth factor: method and discipline. Sun Tzu explains that this includes the organization of the army, the hierarchy of command, the maintenance of supply lines, and the control of military expenditure.
Regarding supply and economic sustainability, one could argue that Iran again holds certain advantages. Because it is defending its own territory, logistics are inherently simpler. Meanwhile, the asymmetrical strategy employed by Iran may impose significant economic costs on both the United States and Israel, whose economies are more dependent on global trade networks.
The Strait of Hormuz provides a clear example. Even without deploying a powerful navy, Iran could potentially disrupt maritime traffic using relatively inexpensive sea drones, creating serious challenges for the U.S. Navy in the confined waters of the Gulf. This explains why proposals to escort tankers have so far been rejected.
I am by no means a military expert, and it would be difficult for me to answer definitively the remaining questions: which side enforces discipline more effectively, which army is better trained, and which maintains more consistent systems of reward and punishment.
However, it is plausible that the Iranian military might compare more favorably with the U.S. military than is often assumed, particularly outside elite American units.
Which Army Is Stronger?
The final question is which army is stronger. In purely conventional terms, the United States clearly holds the advantage. Yet when this factor is weighed alongside all the others, it may not be decisive in this particular conflict.
Some might argue that Sun Tzu’s principles are outdated, given the radically different nature of modern warfare. But are they really?
The Ramadan War suggests that many of his insights remain surprisingly relevant.
